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Abstract 
Qualitative studies of the European Employment Strategy produce conflicting accounts of its 
effectiveness within the Member States. Furthermore, such studies are limited in that they 
predominantly concern a small number of country case studies and one or two particular 
policy issues. Obtaining an accurate overview of the effectiveness of the OMC is therefore 
problematic. This article constructs a quantitative framework to analyse the effectivnes of the 
EES and applies it to ten EU Member States between 2005-2009. The analysis differentiates 
between shallow voluntary compliance, whereby member state responses to the EES 
represent activities which they themselves identify as a priority, and deep voluntary 
normative compliance, whereby member state activity is related to specific Council 
recommendations to improve policies in a particular area. The paper finds substantial 
evidence for both forms of compliance, however, an analysis of the formation of country 
specific recommendations, reveals the deeply politically negotiated nature of their formation 
and the limitations of our findings.  
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Introduction 
Since its launching in 1997, the European Employment Strategy (EES) has been the 
cornerstone of the EU‟s employment policy. As numerous studies have discussed, the 
launching of the strategy was unique in that it applied a soft law mode of governance to the 
policy area within the EU, which subsequently became known as the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) under the Lisbon Strategy (see: European Council 2000: par. 37; 
Ashiagbor 2005: 109-190). In contrast to the traditional Community Method of decision-
making, the OMC represents a more flexible and decentralised approach to policy-making in 
which member states develop their own policies in response to common European objectives 
(Ahonen 2001; De Búrca and Scott 2005: 3-5; Trubek and Trubek 2007; Falkner 2006). In 
short, the OMC involves the fixing of guidelines for the EU with qualitative and quantitative 
indicators, the translation of such guidelines into national and regional policies within the 
member states, and periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review (European Council 2000: 
par. 37; Laffan and Shaw 2005: 11). The OMC guides the policy activisms of the member 
states in two ways: cognitively by the monitoring and evaluation which includes the 
exchange of good practices and innovative approaches; and normatively by the guidelines 
and indicators to support the member states in achieving the objectives. The new governance 
mechanism of the OMC was initially greeted with optimism (Rhodes 2000), however, the 
non-legal binding nature of the OMC and the absence of judical review have created 
scepticism regarding its effectiveness and ability to influence and converge the policies and 
legislation of the Member States (Trubek and Mosher 2003a; 2003b; Trubek, Cottrell and 
Nance 2005; Hatzopoulos 2008).  
The EES has long been considered as an archetypal OMC process. During 2000-04 it was a 
source of inspiration for the similar mechanisms in related areas (Tholoniat 2010: 102). But 
how effective is the EES? We ask this question for two reasons. Firstly, existing studies of 
the EES produce conflicting accounts of its overall effectiveness. Current approaches to the 
topic include qualitative narratives of the potential effectiveness of the EES and its possible 
influence on the policy reforms of the member states (Ashiagbor 2004: 35-62). Empirical 
research is primarily dominated by national case studies, providing an insight into country 
specific developments (Zeitlin and Pochet with Magnussen 2005; Zeitlin and Heidenreich 
2009). Although these approaches provide punctuated examinations of the EES, they face a 
number of limitations in providing an overall evaluation of its effectiveness of an EU of 27 
member states. Furthermore, these approaches are limited as they focus on the cognitive 
effective of the OMC, i.e. shifts in national policy orientations and thinking, rather than on its 
overall effect, i.e. actual changes in national policies and legislation. Secondly, the overall 
effectiveness of the EES, however, is of central importance to the broader debate concerning 
European integration and EU public policy. As the „model‟ OMC the EES, with its 
formulation of country specific recommendations, has become a central governance 
mechanism in Europe 2020, the successor of the EU‟s Lisbon Agenda (European 
Commission 2010: 27-30). The effectiveness of the EES therefore has much broader 
consequences than employment policy per se.     
In response we apply a new quantitative approach to analyse the effectiveness of member 
state responses to the EES. In the first section of the paper we present our framework which 
has three components: firstly the identification of member state policy activism in respect to a 
policy that is governed by the EES; secondly, the identification and categorisation of the type 
of policy activism (i.e. the legal instrument such as a green paper, collective agreement, 
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legislation); and thirdly, the classification of the magnitude of such activism upon the policy 
of the member state (i.e. acknowledgement of the importance of the subject, initiatives 
presenting ideas, parametric change in existing parameters, the adoption of brand new 
policy). The identification of such information is based on the National Reform Programmes 
(NRP) of the Member States. The NRPs report individual member state policy activisms in 
response to the guidelines and the country specific recommendations issued by the Council 
(Ashiagbor 2005: 142-145; Trubek and Mosher 2003: 39). Within the framework we 
differentiate between member state responses which are a simple goodness-of-fit with their 
domestic policies (which we term as “shallow voluntary compliance”) and responses that 
appear to be genuinely inspired by the EES (which we term as “deep voluntary compliance”). 
Genuine EES inspired policy activism is policy activism undertaken by the member states in 
response to the country specific recommendations of the Council, which are intended to 
redirect member states priorities and encourage the undertaking of policy activism that does 
not necessarily fit their national setting (Authors: 2010).  
The second section of the paper presents the first results of the coding process, as applied to 
ten EU member states between 2005-2009.
1
 The selected member states are the Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and the 
UK which represent the different welfare state traditions within the EU member states, as 
well as old versus new member states. The result of this assessment demonstrates that there 
have been significant policy changes within all of the Member States to the EES guidelines 
(shallow voluntary compliance) and the country specific recommendations (deep voluntary 
compliance).
2
 In light of this finding and the apparent significance of the country specific 
recommendations in the EES, we analyse their formation to assess the extent to which they 
actually re-direct the national policies of the member states. The paper concludes with an 
overall analysis of the findings for the EES and the OMC more generally. 
I: Assessing the effectiveness of the European Employment Strategy  
To measure the effectiveness of the EES, three issues need to be addressed: firstly, how and 
where to identify member state policy activism within the EES; secondly, how to identify and 
categorise the type of policy activism; and thirdly, how to assess the magnitude of such 
activism. An obvious way to address these three issues is to systematically analyse the NRPs 
of the member states against the adopted Employment Guidelines of the EES. In agreement 
with the member states, the Commission annually produces the Employment Guidelines for 
the EES. During the first few years these guidelines changed almost each year, however, 
since 2003 they are synchronised with the economic policy guidelines following a three year 
cycle (Bernard 2006; European Commission 2002; European Council 2003) and since 2005 
they have remained unchanged.
3
 Member states are encouraged to transpose specific policy 
objectives in the Employment Guidelines to national level programmes in ways which accord 
with their particular socio-economic circumstances (De La Porte and Pochet 2003a: 17). To 
illustrate their efforts, the member states are required to annually submit a NAP, called 
                                                          
1
 At present a full data set to include all of the EU Member States from 1997 onwards is under construction. For 
more information please contact the authors.  
2
 Although the method is limited in proving that the changes in the national settings are caused because of the 
EES (the EES is one of many other factors that influence policy activism within the member states (De la Porte 
and Pochet 2003: 59-61; Trubek, Cottrell and Nance 2006: 19-20; Zeitlin 2009: 215-216), it at least enables us 
to determine which policies have been undertaken in response to, among other factors, the EES. 
3
 See also the subsequent Council decisions by which the guidelines are annually adopted: European Council 
(2005, 2006, 2007a, 2008a, 2009a).   
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National Reform Programmes in the EES, and the Commission and the Labour and Social 
Affairs Council in turn make an annual assessment of the progress of the individual member 
states (Adnett 2001: 253-64; De La Porte et al 2001: 291-307). Between 2005-2009 specific 
recommendations were made from 2007 onwards by the Council to the member states to 
guide their individual priorities in policy areas which were considered to be areas of 
weakness.  
Analysing the NRPs of the member states against the Employment Guidelines provides a key 
method for discovering the effectiveness of the EES. Inevitably, one draw back of this 
approach is that it cannot take into account behaviour and activity that is not recorded in the 
NRPs. Furthermore, member states potentially have an incentive to overplay developments 
within a particular policy area, so as to appear as „good students‟ and thereby avoid criticism 
by the Commission and the Council (De la Porte and Pochet 2003: 14). Despite these 
limitations the NRPs provide a good proxy of developments within the EES and there is no 
equivalent documentation of such developments available.  
To assess the impact of the Employment Guidelines upon the member states codes are 
assigned to the guidelines. The first of the eight guidelines, integrated guideline 17, is general 
and outlines the overall priorities of the EES. We have therefore omitted this guideline from 
the analysis and focus on the remaining seven. Each of the seven guidelines is broadly 
defined and sub-divides into further specific guidelines (see appendix 1). To analyse member 
state policy activism within the EES the constructed framework consists of three variables: 
firstly, member state identification of a policy of the EES; secondly, the type of instrument 
used to operationalised the aforementioned national policies; and thirdly, the magnitude of 
such activism. The first variable simply captures whether member states actually 
acknowledge the guidelines, whether it be explicitly via the mentioning of a guideline or 
implicitly via a discussion of policy which relates to a guideline. This not only identifies 
where member states are active, but importantly, where they are inactive within the EES.  
Five legal instruments capture the type of instrument used to operationalise the policy 
activism: non-identification; preparatory instruments; soft law; collective agreements; and act 
/ legislation. As this paper is concerned with the effectiveness of the EES, defined as changes 
in national legal orders, such a change can only be constituted by legal instruments. These 
included legally binding measures (act, budget law and collective agreements given effect 
erga omnes), legally non-binding measures that nonetheless have normative effect (soft law, 
codes of conduct, protocols and frameworks) and preparatory documents (policy documents, 
reports, discussion/ working papers, green and white papers which represent a first step 
towards the aforementioned instruments). Where there was evidence of member state 
activity, but it was not clear what type of legal instrument was used, the policy activism was 
categorised as „non-identification‟. For example, in the Dutch NRP of 2006 (p.44), a life 
course savings scheme is introduced.
4
 Although it is clear that the scheme is not a preparatory 
instrument, it is unclear as what else it could be i.e. act or programme. Therefore is has been 
categorised as a „non-identifiable instrument‟.  
Table 1: Classification of legal instruments used to operationalise the OMC in the Member 
States. 
 
                                                          
4
 All NRPs referred to in this paper and used in the data set are available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=101&langId=en.  
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Legal Instrument Explanation 
 
Preparatory Instrument 
 
 
Activities which include programmes and white and green 
papers 
 
Soft Law  
 
Such as codes of conduct, protocols, soft institutions and 
policy rules 
 
Collective Agreement  
 
Agreements between the social partners 
 
Act / Legislation  
 
Any act or legislation passed by Parliament including budget 
law and the creation of institutions.  
 
 
Table 2: Classification of the magnitude of reform created by the legal instrument  
Magnitude of Activism Explanation 
 
Lip Service 
 
Acknowledgement that an objective is important, but not 
accompanied by an activity. 
 
Preparatory Activities  
 
Initiatives such as ideas, objectives, programmes, discussions 
and public opinions for policies, but also a bill that is sent to 
parliament or the establishment of a working group, task 
force or commission.  
 
Parametric Reform 
 
Refers to a change in the existing parameters, instruments or 
institutions, such as benefit levels or the change of an article 
of an act or a change in the tasks of an institution.  
 
Instrumental Reform  
 
Refers to the adoption of an entirely new policy, a policy that 
replaces an existing one or that abolishes an existing policy.  
 
To judge the magnitude of the legal instrument and the scale of the normative effect of the 
OMC a separate typology has been developed for classifying the magnitude of the policy 
activism. An assumption underlying this typology is the belief that it is important not to 
conflate the type of legal instrument with its overall impact on the national legal order: while 
some relationship between the two variables is expected, member states may introduce an 
instrument, such as an act, which can either change the parameters of an existing policy or 
create brand new policy – either way, the scale of such a change is significant.  
The scale of the magnitude is categorised as follows. Firstly, „none‟ for where there has been 
no identification of a policy objective. Secondly, „lip service‟ for the acknowledgement of an 
objective, but which is not accompanied by policy activism – therefore suggesting only minor 
shifts in cognitive processes. Thirdly, „preparatory activities‟, such as initiatives, ideas, 
objectives, programmes, discussions public opinions, working groups, task forces and bills 
sent to parliament which represent more substantive shifts within cognitive behaviour. 
Fourthly, parametric reform which refers to a change in an existing policy parameter, 
instruments or institutions, such as benefit levels, the change of an article of an act, a change 
in a level of funding, or the change in task on an institution. Fifthly, „instrumental reform‟ 
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which refers to the adoption of a brand new policy, a policy that replaces an existing one or a 
new institution.  
NRPs for each year between 2005-2009 for the ten member states are analysed in accordance 
with the constructed framework. The result is a dataset which captures the policy directions 
of the member states - shallow voluntary effectiveness. To assess whether the EES creates 
deep voluntary effectiveness, the second stage of the analysis focuses on the country specific 
recommendations made by the Council, on proposal of the Commission, to the member 
states. From 2005-2009 such recommendations began from 2007 (European Council 2007b, 
2008b, 2009b,) and are targeted at areas of weakness or challenges within a member state 
owing to a lack of activity or under-activity. Alongside such recommendations, focus areas 
are identified. Therefore, both the recommendations and focus areas are included in the 
analysis since they both aim to steer the national priorities and as such, require the member 
states to develop policy activism in these areas. The recommendations and focus areas are 
subsequently coded in accordance with appendix 1.  
Any evaluation of the NRPs will be subjective. A further problem is that the NRPs do not just 
represent explanations of specific policy activisms within the specified year. As De la Porte 
and Pochet (2003: 14) note, member states tend to recycle their national programmes in view 
of European policies; emphasise what is in concordance with European priorities; and 
minimise or to camouflage the differences.
5
 Extracting the exact policy developments of a 
particular year can therefore be tricky. To minimise these issues we adopted a number of 
strategies. Firstly, the analytical framework was designed to differentiate between where 
member states were simply referring to a guideline without giving any substantive policy 
content, versus actual substantive policy developments. Secondly, within the analysis, we 
were cautious when assigning policy activities to a particular typology and assumed that 
member states overemphasised their developments. Thirdly, to avoid a double-counting of 
policy and thereby construct an accurate dataset of policy developments, only polices and 
activities which were agreed, passed in parliament or initiated in that particular year in 
question were analysed. For example, all of the 2006 NRPs contain some discussion of policy 
developments in 2005, but these should have been analysed in 2005. Including them again in 
the dataset of 2006 would in effect „double-count‟ them and create a false impression of the 
actual developments of the member states. There are some exceptions to this rule as NRPs are 
required to be written and submitted in September / October, member states can report policy 
activity of a previous year, particularly for the final quarter. Thus, although the NRPs appear 
to concern calendar years, they do not, as they actually run from September/October to the 
following September/October. The analysis of the NRPs was therefore respectful of this 
issue. If specific policy was found in a NRP relating to a previous year that had not been 
mentioned in the NRP of that year, it was added to the dataset of the previous year.  
Fourthly, in the years of 2005 and 2008 member states were asked to report not only the 
activities they had undertaken, but also the activities they intended to adopt. We regard such 
discussions as lists of intentions, rather than actual concrete policy adoption. Although they 
are included in the datasets of the respective years, they can at the most only be considered as 
preparatory instruments in the legal instruments category (therefore assigned a value of 0, if 
only vague intentions were presented, and a value of 1 when more concrete intentions are 
presented), and as a magnitude of either lip service (value 1) or preparatory instruments 
(value 2). Finally, to reduce the level of subjectivity in the dataset and increase the 
                                                          
5
 An exemption to this is Poland which follows its own national priorities and strategy in its NRPs. 
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consistency of the results, both authors were involved in classifying the NRPs. We classified 
one country case study together to ensure that as far as possible we were using the typologies 
in the same way. There after we each took the lead on specific cases, consulted each other on 
policy activisms that were difficult to classify and cross checked the completed datasets.  
Selection of Case Studies   
The framework is applied to the NRPs of ten member states over a five year period (between 
2005-2009).This period was chosen for three reasons: firstly, unlike previous years the 
Employment Guidelines remained unchanged for this period enabling the analysis to capture 
the dynamics of the EES more consistently over time; secondly, the specified time period is 
more representative of the current EU in that it enables the analysis to include the new 
member states; and thirdly, this particular period from 2007 includes the setting of national 
priorities by the Council and is therefore able to capture deep voluntary compliance.    
The selected member states are: Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, the UK. There are two underlying reasons for the 
selection of these member states. Firstly, they represent a mixture of old and new member 
states. This distinction is significant because new member states are often considered to be 
laggards within EU soft law (Wógcicka and Grabowski 2007; Potůček 2007; De la Rosa 
2005). Secondly, the selected member states represent a mixture of the different clusters of 
welfare states within the EU: Latvia and the UK represent the neoliberal cluster (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Keune 2006); France, Germany and Italy the conservatist-corporatist cluster 
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Goodwin 1999); the Czech Republic and Poland represent a mixture 
of the neoliberal and conservatist-corporatist welfare states (Keune 2006); and the 
Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden represent the social democratic cluster (Esping-Andersen 
1990; Goodwin et el 1999; Keune 2006).  
II: Findings  
In order to address our overall research question we organized our data analysis around two 
sub-questions: 
1) Does the EES create shallow voluntary compliance within the member states? 
2) Does the EES create deep voluntary compliance beyond the national priorities of the 
member states?   
 
Does the EES create shallow voluntary compliance within the member states?  
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate that there is considerable policy activism within the member states 
for the EES with a total number of 1051 activities having been undertaken between 2005-
2009 of which 886 resulted in the initiation or adoption of a legal instrument. The figure in 
table 4 is higher than the total number of policy activisms in table 3 because the framework 
also captures member state activity which is pure lip-service, i.e. where member states simply 
make reference to a policy guideline which is not accompanied by a legal activity. Between 
2005 and 2009 there were a total of 165 lip-service references and a total number of 886 
instruments of which 370 were preparatory instruments and 516 were legal in nature. Of the 
516 legal instruments adopted by the 10 member states, 156 are soft law, 17 are collective 
agreements, 264 are hard law and 79 are undefined instruments. In terms of magnitude of the 
516 legal instruments, 207 have created parametric reform in the member states and 309 have 
created instrumental change.   
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From the two tables it is clear that there is a considerable amount of activity in the member 
states with respect to the EES. However, as this paper is concerned with the policy change 
effect on of the EES in the member states, it is only concerned with certain aspects of the 
data. Real policy change is generated in a member state via instruments that create policy 
reform within the national policy mixes (soft law instruments, collective agreements, hard 
law instruments and the non-definable instruments). The further presentation of the dataset is 
therefore confined to the data on these instruments. 
Table 3: Typology of legal instruments adopted by the ten Member States for the European 
Employment Strategy between 2005-2009. 
Sort of 
instrument 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005-2009 
 
1.  
preparatory 
instrument 
 
 
70 
 
 
86 
 
 
73 
 
 
73 
 
 
68 
 
 
370 
 
2.  
Soft law 
 
 
22 
 
 
48 
 
 
32 
 
 
19 
 
 
35 
 
 
156 
 
3. 
Collective 
agreement 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
3 
 
 
17 
 
4.  
Hard law 
 
 
40 
 
 
52 
 
 
60 
 
 
56 
 
 
56 
 
 
264 
 
n.a. 
undefined 
instrument 
 
 
7 
 
 
29 
 
 
13 
 
 
11 
 
 
19 
 
 
79 
 
Total 
 
 
143 
 
220 
 
180 
 
162 
 
181 
 
886 
 
Table 4 The magnitude of the legal instruments adopted by the ten Member States for the 
European Employment Strategy between 2005-2009. 
 
Magnitude 
activism 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005-2009 
 
1. 
Lip-service 
 
 
45 
 
 
33 
 
 
28 
 
 
38 
 
 
21 
 
 
165 
 
2.  
Preparatory 
 
 
70 
 
 
86 
 
 
73 
 
 
73 
 
 
68 
 
 
370 
 
3. 
Parametric 
reform 
 
 
26 
 
 
39 
 
 
55 
 
 
39 
 
 
48 
 
 
207 
 
4.  
Instrumental 
change 
 
 
47 
 
 
95 
 
 
52 
 
 
50 
 
 
65 
 
 
309 
 
Total 
 
 
188 
 
253 
 
208 
 
200 
 
202 
 
1051 
 
Figure 1 indicates the number of instruments adopted per member state sub-divided by the 
type of legislative activities for the period 2005-2009. Given that member states have 
different traditions in regulating employment policies, the data confirms the difference in 
legislative activism between the member states. With 99 legislative instruments most of the 
516 “ripples” are created in France, followed by Slovenia (82), the Netherlands (78), Latvia 
(64), Sweden (49), the UK (34), Italy (32), Poland (30), the Czech Republic (26), and 
 9 
Germany (22). The use of collective agreements is only reported by five of the member states 
and is the least used instrument. In comparison, soft law instruments are used by all of the 
member states and they are most commonly used by Latvia and Slovenia. With the exception 
of Latvia and Slovenia, all member states mostly use hard law instruments to comply with the 
requirements of the EES. This illustrates that when member states demonstrate shallow 
voluntary compliance, they do not shy away from the use of hard law instruments that have a 
strong impact on their domestic policies (impacts that either reform existing parameters or 
cause instrumental changes).  
Figure 1: Legal instruments adopted by the ten member states between 2005-2009 
 
 
The general data strongly indicate that there is shallow voluntary compliance within the 
member states. However, within the EES member states start from different policy mixes and 
are therefore able to initiate policy reform in areas where they do not meet the agreed 
objectives. Furthermore, they will be less active in policy areas where the objectives have 
already been achieved. One of the consequences is that policy activism can vary significantly 
between the member states. Further segregation of the data is therefore needed and table 5 
illustrates the policy activisms per guideline for the member states between 2005-2009. 
The most striking observation from table 5 is the wide variety of activism between the 
member states. Giving explanations for this variety would lead us into speculation only. At 
the most it can be a slight indication of the importance member states attach to employment 
policies. A significant finding of these results is that, based on the general policy activism of 
the member states over the course of time, the member states do not really show trends with 
respect to their clusters of welfare states. For example, France and Germany which both 
Esping-Andersen (1990) and Goodwin et al (1999) categorise as being part of the 
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conservative-corporatist welfare cluster, represent the two extremes of the overall findings. 
Latvia and Slovenia, which are two new member states, but represent the two polar welfare 
states (neo-corporatist versus neoliberal) that can be found in Central and Eastern Europe are 
the second and fourth most active member states within the EES. The only exception to this 
is the Netherlands Slovenia and Sweden, the three social democratic welfare states, which 
demonstrate some consistency with each other. Another significant finding of the results, as 
presented in table 5, is that there is no difference in policy activism between the old and the 
new member states with respect to ripples, as both groups are at the top and bottom of the 
total number of policy activisms.   
Table 5 Number of activities of the ten Member States per coded guideline in the period 
2005-2009 
 
Table 5 reveals, with a few exceptions, there to have been policy changes in the member 
states in all of the guidelines. However, Poland has no activities in guideline 21 which is 
mainly concerned with the issue of flexicurity. During the period of analysis there was little 
Guideline Sub-
gl 
CR F D It Lt Nl Pl Si Sv UK total 
18  4 30 7 11 12 30 8 21 15 5 143 
 A 0 10 0 3 4 6 2 3 3 1  
 B 1 3 3 2 1 8 2 5 2 0  
 C 3 4 1 3 3 7 2 6 2 2  
 D 0 11 3 0 1 4 2 4 0 2  
 E 0 2 0 3 3 5 0 3 8 0  
 
19  6 27 2 1 10 15 11 18 8 10 108 
 A 0 13 2 0 6 6 9 15 2 5  
 B 6 11 0 1 0 9 2 3 5 4  
 C 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1  
 
20  5 7 0 4 3 3 6 6 7 1 42 
 A 2 4 0 4 1 0 6 1 4 1  
 B 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 0  
 C 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0  
 D 3 2 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 0  
 
21  1 10 4 7 21 10 0 10 2 1 66 
 A 1 5 1 2 4 4 0 2 1 1  
 B 0 0 0 5 6 0 0 4 1 0  
 C 0 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0  
 D 0 2 1 0 6 3 0 2 0 0  
 E 0 1 2 0 3 2 0 2 0 0  
 
22  1 7 0 2 0 3 2 4 0 0 19 
 A 0 4 0 2 0 3 0 1 0 0  
 B 1 3 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0  
 
23  3 11 8 3 8 8 1 11 6 13 72 
 A 0 3 7 2 4 1 1 7 4 5  
 B 0 7 0 1 0 4 0 1 0 1  
 C 3 1 1 0 4 3 0 3 2 7  
 
24  6 7 1 4 10 9 2 12 11 4 66 
 A 5 3 1 3 6 6 2 5 8 2  
 B 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1  
 C 1 4 0 1 3 3 0 6 3 1  
 
total  26 99 22 32 64 78 30 82 49 34 516 
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impetus for such activity in Poland as reforms were introduced in 2002-2004 which the NRP 
states: „have enabled a more flexible approach to work time and diversified forms of 
employment” and that the subject is “less popular in Poland than elsewhere in the world”.6 As 
a result, there is little impetus for Poland to continue with policy activism in this area. A 
similar situation can also be found in Germany with respect to guideline 20, since it reformed 
and modernised its public employment services prior to 2005 with the Hartz II and III 
reforms, our dataset does not capture such activity.
7
   
Table five illustrates where member states are the most active, which is guideline 18 
concerning the promotion of a life-cycle approach to work and aims to reduce youth 
unemployment (18a), to increase female participation (18b), a better reconciliation between 
work and family life (18c), support active ageing (18d) and modernise social protection 
systems (18e). Given the high number of voluntary compliance with this guideline, it would 
appear that there is a general goodness-of-fit with this guideline and the member states. 
Confirmation of this presumption can be found in the NRPs where member states also write 
about their national priorities. In the French NRP of 2007 (p. 47), for instance, it is noted that 
“the integration of the youth in society is an on-going preoccupation”, indicating that it is a 
policy that requires constant attention.  
Guideline 19, which promotes labour market policies (19a and b) and the creation of new 
jobs (19c), also demonstrates a high level of compliance - a subject that is apparently high on 
the domestic agenda‟s of some old member states (France with 27 activities and the 
Netherlands with 15) as well as some of the new member states (Slovenia with 18 activities 
and Poland with 11). However, it has also low priority within the old (Germany with 2 
activities and Italy merely 1) as well as the new members (the Czech Republic with 6 
activities). Guideline 20 is given a medium level of priority which aims to improve the 
matching of the labour market needs through the modernisation and strengthening of labour 
market institutions (20a), improve the mobility for workers across Europe (20b), the better 
anticipation of skill needs, the tackling of labour market shortages and bottlenecks (20c) and 
appropriate management of economic migration. In particular, the modernisation of 
employment services (France, Italy, Poland, and Sweden show a relatively high level of 
activity) and the management of economic migration (the Czech Republic and Slovenia show 
relatively high activity) seem to be part of the national priorities.  
Almost one third of the activity in guideline 21 stems from Latvia (21 of the 66). One of the 
issues covered by this guideline is undeclared work, which is high in Latvia. The reduction of 
this is therefore a national priority that is on the agenda for the whole period of the case 
study.
8
 Again this a perfect example of shallow voluntary compliance based on the goodness-
of-fit of the subject. This also seems to be the case for Italy, with no less than five activities 
aimed at reducing undeclared work. Furthermore, France, the Netherlands and Slovenia also 
give considerable attention to this guideline with 10 normative ripples each. The number of 
activities is again more equally divided among the member states in respect of guideline 23. 
There is a high number of activity for the UK, more than one-third of its total of activities: 13 
of the 34. Even more striking is the fact that the majority of these instruments were adopted 
in 2009 (improving skills), indicating that they were a response to the economic downturn. 
On the other hand, France and the Netherlands focus on the reduction of early school leavers 
                                                          
6
 National Reform Programme for 2005-2008 of the Republic of Poland, p. 30.  
7
 These reforms took place in 2002 and 2004 respectively. Cf  Vogler-Ludwig 2005. 
8
 Cf. The Latvian NRPs 2005, p. 33; 2006, p. 32; 2007, p. 30; 2008, p. 49; and 2009, p. 38. 
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(7 and 4 acts respectively) which are further examples as the subjects fit their national 
priorities.  
With respect to guideline 24 the member states demonstrate a medium level of activity with a 
common focus on the improvement of the quality of education and vocational training (24a). 
Little activity is undertaken with respect to coded guideline 24b, which is concerned with 
easing and diversifying access for all to education and training. Although the inactivity stands 
out, it is not unexpected, since the policies that should be developed to meet this guideline are 
also part of other guidelines, among which 19a, 20a, 21a, 21e, 23c and 24a. It could be that 
the policy activism associated with this guideline are already reported in the context of 
another guideline 
As far as shallow voluntary effectiveness is concerned, the data provides compelling 
evidence that this is the case. Firstly, in the period 2005-2009 member states have undertaken 
considerable policy reforms at the domestic level under the guidance of the EES. Secondly, 
the results also demonstrate that with few exceptions, member states have complied with all 
the guidelines (Poland has not acted in guideline 21; and Germany, Latvia, Sweden and the 
UK have not acted in guideline 22). However, where member states have acted, evidence is 
found that this is based on a goodness-of-fit, i.e. member state activism within the guidelines 
corresponds to the national priorities, as identified by their NRPs. The second stage of the 
analysis therefore assesses whether member states also comply with the EES where there is 
no obvious goodness-of-fit with the national priorities.  
Does the EES create deep voluntary compliance beyond the national priorities of the member 
states?   
 
To assess whether the EES creates deep voluntary compliance, specific attention is given to 
the recommendations made by the Council, on proposal by the Commission, to the member 
states. The recommendations are connected to the coded guidelines and issued once a year 
from 2007- the results of the analysis are shown in table 6. The second column of table 6 
represents the total number of recommendations for the member states, while the third 
column represents the number of guidelines for which there are recommendations between 
2007-2009. For example, Italy is recommended to improve the operation of the employment 
services on three occasions (in 2007, 2008 and 2009), a subject that is promoted by coded 
guideline 20a. The number of recommendations is therefore higher than the number of 
guidelines the member state should prioritise. As such, the table captures both the number of 
recommendations over time and the number of policy areas the member states need to focus 
on (see also Appendix 2).  
Column four represents the total number of activities per member state with respect to the 
recommendations. This can be higher than the number of recommendations in column three 
because member states may introduce more than one policy reform to address a specific 
recommendation. For example, to meet the recommendation on improving the operation of 
the employment services, Italy has adopted a total of four policy activisms -one soft law 
instrument in 2007, one hard law instrument in 2008 and two hard law instruments in 2009. 
The fifth column therefore provides the total number of coded guidelines for which there has 
been at least one normative ripple within the national legal order. The final column expresses, 
as a percentage, the number of guidelines in which there has been at least one normative 
ripple over the number of guidelines with at least one recommendation (columns five and 
three).   
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Table 6 Ripples created in response to the recommendations 
 
 
Country 
 
Number of 
recomm 
Number of 
guidelines with 
recomm 
Number of 
Normative 
ripples 
Compliance 
with 
guidelines 
Percentage 
of 
compliance 
Czech Re.  20 9 3 3 34 
France 11 6 8 4 67 
Germany 12 6 1 1 16 
Italy 16 7 14 4 57 
Latvia 14 8 8 4 50 
Netherlands 10 4 15 3 75 
Poland 12 6 10 4 67 
Slovenia 12 7 7 5 70 
Sweden 12 5 9 4 80 
UK 7 3 7 3 100 
total 126 61 82 35 57 
 
The result of this analysis illustrates that all member states have undertaken some policy 
activism with respect to the recommendations. However, the level of such activism varies. 
With the exception of the UK, not all member states act upon the recommended guidelines, 
they appear to pick and choose the subjects that possibly fit their national settings. For 
instance, in 2007, 2008 and 2009, the Czech Republic is recommended to prioritise incentives 
to invest in training for older and low skilled workers, but repeatedly fails to act up on this 
recommendation. With six guideline recommendations, but only policy reform response, 
Germany (16 %) is the least complaint member state, followed by the Czech Republic (34 %) 
and Latvia (50%). The most complaint member state is the UK (100%), followed by Sweden 
(80%), the Netherlands (75%), Slovenia (70%), France (67%), Poland (67%) and Italy (57%). 
Combined the member states are complaint in 57 per cent of the guideline recommendations. 
Finally, it is worth noting the difference between the old and new member states, as well as 
the different welfare clusters. Firstly, with respect to deep voluntary compliance, again, there 
is a spread of performance between old and new member states. Some new member states are 
less receptive than others (Slovenia vs. the Czech Republic). Secondly, the only significant 
trend within the welfare state clusters is that the Social Democratic cluster states (the 
Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden) are the second, third and fourth best performing member 
states. Member states of other clusters are not grouped together, as performance varies within 
particular clusters (the UK vs. Latvia or France vs. Germany).    
The results demonstrate that member states can and do respond to country specific 
recommendations, however, two issues arise from the analysis of the recommendations. 
Firstly, although the results demonstrate broadly positive member state responses to the 
recommendations, the two least active member states in the EES, the Czech Republic and 
Germany, are also the two member states that have responded the least to the 
recommendations. In this respect, the EES is limited, as it is unable to stimulate policy 
activism in member states that are unwilling to comply. Nevertheless, the remaining member 
states demonstrate positive responses to country specific recommendations. Secondly, the 
most striking feature of the recommendation process is the similar number of 
recommendations issued to both good and poorly performing member states. While the 
Czech Republic may be an outlier to this trend, between 2007-2009, the two best performing 
member states, France and the Netherlands received 11 and 10 recommendations; while the 
second and third worst performing member states, Germany and Poland, each received 12 
recommendations.  
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The recommendation process of the EES is the least understood aspect of the OMC. 
Methodologically, it is simple: member states submit their NRPs to the Commission which 
assesses the overall progress of each individual member state and identifies areas of 
weakness; member states are then issued with country specific recommendations to target 
such weaknesses under Articles 99(2) and 128(4) of the Treaty. In this respect, the 
recommendation process appears as a powerful tool to initiate EES inspired reform within the 
member states where they would otherwise fail to act. The Commission takes the role of an 
assessor of the member states against the overall objectives of the EES, and provides 
feedback (recommendations) outlining the individual areas of weakness. Such areas of 
weakness are monitored in subsequent years.  
The formation of country specific recommendations is, however, a politically negotiated 
process both within the Commission, and between the Commission and the member states.
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The first stage of the recommendation procedure involves the evaluation of the NRPs by 
country desk officers in DG EMPL, who initially draft the country specific recommendations 
(interview 1). Subsequently, the recommendations are internally screened to ensure a 
harmonization between the member states, both in terms of the actual wording (in which 
standardized words are used and care is taken not to describe the seriousness of a problem) 
and the number of recommendations given to each member state. Therefore despite 
differences in performance of the member states, the Commission ensures that the number of 
recommendations between them is relatively similar (interview 3). This minimizes political 
fallout between the Commission and the member states which could delay or block the 
adoption of the recommendations in the Council (interview 3). As one representative noted: 
„we are restricted in what we can do and say and the amount and wording of the 
recommendations is clearly disproportionate with the worst performing member states 
receiving only one or two more recommendations per year than the best performers‟ 
(interview 2). The recommendations are subsequently communicated to the Secretariat-
General in the Commission which, after its own screening process, communicates them to the 
Employment Committee in the Council (EMCO). Following their communication, the Sec-
Gen opens up informal bilateral negotiations where each member state is provided with the 
opportunity to discuss any problems they have with their own recommendations. This 
involves the member states negotiating with the Commission on the number of 
recommendations and / or their exact wording. Member states can request as many bilateral 
negotiations as they deem necessary (interview 2).  
During the whole process, member states aim for recommendations that are few in number, 
simple to understand and suit their domestic polices. There are occasions when member states 
will use the recommendations to support a domestic reform agenda, but only if it corresponds 
to national priorities (interview 2). Outside of the informal bilaterals, member states, via their 
permanent representations in Brussels, are involved in intense lobby of the Sec-Gen to further 
influence the recommendations (interview 4). Once the member states are satisfied with their 
particular set of recommendations, EMCO forms a common position. In reality, every 
member state has to be satisfied with their recommendations; they form a single policy 
document in which all of the recommendations for all member states are compiled and agreed 
under a single vote. The Treaty makes no reference to the voting procedure of the 
recommendations, but in general the issue of employment is subject to qualified majority 
                                                          
9
 Owing to the absence of any account  of the forging of  country specific recommendations, both in the current 
academic literature and official EU documents, we conducted four anonymous interviews with EU officials 
involved in the EES in both the Commission and the Council during Nov / Dec 2010.   
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voting (QMV) under articles 148 and 149. In practice, formal QMV is rarely used and 
informally the Council will agree on the final document by consensus (interview 1). This 
further strengthens the influence of the member states over their own recommendations, as 
they each hold an informal veto over the approval of all country specific recommendations. 
Following the common position, the recommendations are approved by COREPER II and the 
Council of Ministers as a matter of formality.    
Therefore, despite the potential influence of the recommendations on the policies of the 
member states, their significance should not be overstated. As one representative noted: „the 
final agreed set of country specific recommendations was always very different compared to 
their initial drafting by DG EMPL‟ (interview 2). Recommendations are therefore quasi- 
extensions of the member states acting in areas which they themselves identify as a priority 
and are a „goodness-of-fit‟ with their domestic situations. In this respect, they act as a tool to 
further identify priorities of the member states.  
III: Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to assess the effectiveness of the EES. As an archetypal OMC 
within the EU, the EES is of central importance to assess the effectiveness of the EU‟s soft 
law mode of governance. In response to the limitations of existing qualitative approaches to 
the topic, which provide only punctuated examinations of the effectiveness of the EES / 
OMC in an EU of 27 Member States, we applied our new framework to analyse the 
effectiveness of the EES in ten Member States between 2005-2009. The ten Member States 
chosen represent a mixture of both old and new member states, as well as the different 
welfare traditions in the EU. Although this only partially responds to the criticisms of the 
existing approaches, it represents a first attempt to assess the effectiveness of the EES for a 
large number of case studies over a five year period. The strength of the approach is that it 
can be expanded to include all EU member states, for all years in which the EES has been in 
operation.  
The assessment of the effectiveness of the EES for the ten Member States involved analysing 
their NRPs against the guidelines agreed by the Member States and applying our framework. 
From the resultant dataset, we found considerable evidence of Member State activity in the 
EES, indicating substantial shallow voluntary compliance. However, where the Member 
States have acted, evidence was found that this was based on a goodness-of-fit, i.e. activism 
which corresponds to national priorities. There is little evidence to support the argument that 
old Member States are more active in the EES than new Member States – both groups of 
Member States can be found within the worst and best performers. Furthermore, clusters of 
welfare states demonstrated little similarity, with one possible exception being the Social 
Democratic Member States (the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden) which were in the top 
five most active. The trend of the Social Democratic Member States is possibly a result of the 
EES being inspired by the welfare policies of such countries.  
We also found considerable evidence that the Member States responded well to the country 
specific recommendations, indicating substantial deep voluntary compliance. As with shallow 
voluntary compliance, there was no difference in performance between old and new Member 
States and, with the exception of the Social Democratic Member States, trends within specific 
welfare clusters. One important finding is that the Member States who were the least active 
with respect to shallow voluntary compliance, the Czech Republic and Germany, were also 
the Member States that responded the least to the country specific recommendations. In this 
sense, the EES is limited, as it is unable to stimulate policy activism of the Member States 
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that are unwilling to comply. The most striking feature of the dataset concerning deep 
voluntary compliance is the similar number of country specific recommendations given to 
both good and poorly performing Member States. We therefore analysed the formation of the 
country specific recommendations to contextualise the significance of our findings.    
Our analysis reveals that the formation of country specific recommendations is a politically 
negotiated process with the Member States ultimately being in the driving seat. Although 
recommendations are initially drafted by the Commission, bi-lateral negotiations between the 
Commission and the Member States, give the Member States a considerable influence over 
the number of recommendations issued and / or their exact wording. Furthermore, the 
compilation of all country specific recommendations into a single document, which is agreed 
upon in Council, further strengthens the influence of the Member States, as they each hold an 
informal, yet powerful, veto over the whole process. The result is that country specific 
recommendations are little more than an extension of shallow voluntary compliance in the 
Member States.   
The OMC was launched in policy areas in which the EU has relatively little or no legal 
competence and therefore serves to promote coordination and integration in sensitive policy 
areas. Within the EES we have demonstrated that there has been considerable policy 
activism, but that the Member States are ultimately in control of the process; the role of the 
Commission is marginal. The findings of this paper point to the conclusion that within the 
EES and more broadly the OMC, it is difficult to get the Member States to move beyond 
policy activism which they themselves identify as a priority or are a goodness-of-fit with the 
domestic situation. Thus, despite considerable policy activism with respect to both shallow 
and deep voluntary compliance, the EES, and the OMC in general, is an intergovernmental 
process in which sovereignty has yet to be pooled and Member States remain in the driving 
seat.    
Whether such findings demonstrate the effectiveness of the EES remains open to 
interpretation. That the Member States remain in control of the governance process does not 
necessarily signify ineffectiveness. The OMC was designed to respect the divergence of 
policies and institutions found within the Member States, rather than to create convergence 
and harmonization which would require a stronger legal basis and the surrendering of some 
sovereignty in the necessary policy field. In short, the OMC was designed to enable the 
Member States to find their own pathways to modernizing their domestic policies and 
therefore requires their input. From this perspective there have been significant achievements 
within the EES. However, alternatively, that it remains difficult to stimulate policy activism 
within the Member States beyond simple goodness-of-fit, points to a significant 
ineffectiveness of the OMC. The Member States can simply avoid contentious reform. 
Furthermore, the Member States who are the least active also respond the least to country 
specific recommendations. This provides the Member States with the opportunity to „foot-
drag‟ should the domestic political constellations provide little incentive for policy activism 
within a policy area. Unlike traditional hard law there are no immediate penalties for the 
Member States in the OMC, as even the country specific recommendations can be considered 
relatively toothless.   
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